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ROAD CLOSED:  
THE INEQUITABLE TREATMENT OF  
PRE-CLOSING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
CLAIMANTS UNDER THE AUTO INDUSTRY 
BAILOUT 
O thou wicked servant, I forgave thee all that debt, because thou 
desiredst me: 
 
[S]houldest not thou also have had compassion on thy fellow servant, 
even as I had pity on thee?1 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout 2008, the American automobile manufacturing industry 
faced a steady decline in market share and revenue due to increasing foreign 
competition and decreasing demand resulting from spiking oil prices.2 
Pension obligations and other legacy costs, coupled with poor  
decision-making and financial planning on the part of management, only 
exacerbated the problem, and by the end of 2008 domestic sales fell to their 
lowest ebb in over 25 years.3 On December 19, 2008, Secretary Henry 
Paulson of the United States Department of the Treasury (Treasury 
Department) announced the Treasury Department’s and President George 
W. Bush’s intention to prevent imminent and potentially disastrous 
bankruptcies in this industry by providing billions of dollars in loans to 
General Motors Corporation and its related companies (GM) and Chrysler 
L.L.C. and its related companies (Chrysler) under the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP).4 The rationale for the bailout was manifold5 but is, 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Matthew 18:32–33. 
 2. See Alex Ortolani, GM, Chrysler May Lead Sales Slide to Cap 16-Year Low, BLOOMBERG, 
Jan. 2, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid=aem7CeFJvoNg&pid=20601087. 
 3. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, SEPTEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE USE OF TARP 
FUNDS IN SUPPORT AND REORGANIZATION OF THE DOMESTIC AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 1 (2009), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg11151964/pdf/CHRG-111shrg1115 
1964.pdf. 
 4. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Secretary Paulson Statement on Stabilizing the 
Automotive Industry (Dec. 19, 2008), available at http://financialstability.gov/latest/hp1332.html 
[hereinafter Press Release, Secretary Paulson]; Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), 12 
U.S.C.A. §§ 5211–5241 (2008). 
 5. See In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 477 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (explaining 
that U.S. automakers’ failure would result in the unemployment of an unacceptably large number 
of Americans employed directly by the automakers). The resultant failure of businesses that rely 
directly (such as suppliers and dealerships) and indirectly (such as local businesses in factory 
towns) on the industry would magnify those losses exponentially, resulting in essentially 
incalculable costs to the American taxpayer. Id.  
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perhaps, best summarized by the term “too big to fail.”6 Through the end of 
2008 and the first half of 2009, President Barack Obama’s Administration 
and the Treasury Department, under the new leadership of Timothy 
Geithner, continued the government’s commitment to GM7 and Chrysler8 
by making them a series of loans, guarantees, and equity investments 
before, during, and after each filed for Chapter 11.9 The government’s 
purpose was to ensure the automakers’ orderly restructuring10 in 
anticipation of bankruptcy.11 
While the paths taken by GM and Chrysler differed, most of the salient 
components were essentially the same: (1) each relied on massive federal 
financial assistance12 to stave off what would have been a disastrous 
liquidation;13 (2) each received this assistance before, during, and after 
                                                                                                                 
 6. See, e.g., George W. Kuney & Michael St. James, A Proposal for Chapter 10: 
Reorganization for “Too Big to Fail” Companies, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2009, at 73.  
 7. See ProPublica, Eye on the Bailout: General Motors, http://bailout.propublica.org/entities/ 
233-general-motors [hereinafter ProPublica–General Motors] (last visited Feb. 11, 2010) 
(detailing the government’s commitment to GM totaling $50,744,684,329 and breaking down as 
follows: $884 million debt obligation (Dec. 29, 2008); $13.4 billion debt obligation (Dec. 31, 
2008); $2 billion debt obligation (Apr. 22, 2009); $4 billion debt obligation (May 20, 2009); 
$360.6 million debt obligation guaranteeing GM’s warranty commitments for its cars during the 
bankruptcy period under the Warranty Commitment Assistance Program (May 27, 2009); $23 
billion debt obligation, equity interest (June 3, 2009); and $7.1 billion debt obligation (July 10, 
2009)). 
 8. See ProPublica, Eye on the Bailout: Chrysler, http://bailout.propublica.org/entities/93-
chrysler [hereinafter ProPublica–Chrysler] (last visited Feb. 11, 2010) (detailing the government’s 
commitment to Chrysler totaling $12,812,130,642 and breaking down as follows: Pre-filing: $4 
billion debt obligation (Jan. 2, 2009) and $280.1 million debt obligation guaranteeing Chrysler’s 
warranty commitments for its cars during the bankruptcy period under the Warranty Commitment 
Program (Apr. 29, 2009); During Bankruptcy: $1.9 billion debt obligation (May 1, 2009); Post-
Closing: $6.6 billion debt obligation (May 27, 2009)). 
 9. GM filed its Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
Southern District of New York on June 1, 2009. In re General Motors, 407 B.R. at 479. Chrysler 
filed its Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern 
District of New York on April 30, 2009. In re Chrysler L.L.C., 405 B.R. 84, 87 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2009), aff’d, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated as moot sub nom. Ind. State Police Pension 
Trust v. Chrysler L.L.C., 130 S.Ct. 1015 (2009). The Supreme Court remanded the appeal to the 
Second Circuit with instructions to vacate its affirmance as moot. Ind. State Police Pension Trust 
v. Chrysler L.L.C., 130 S.Ct. 1015, 1015 (2009). Because there were no allegations of bad faith on 
the part of the purchaser and because the decision of the bankruptcy court was not stayed pending 
appeal, the vacatur operates only to eradicate the precendential value of the Cicuit Court’s 
decision, and does not unwind the sale authorized by the bankruptcy court. See 11 U.S.C. § 
363(m) (2006). See also posting of Leo Donofrio, Esq. to Natural Born Citizen: Respecting the 
Constitution?, http://naturalborncitizen.wordpress.com/2009/12/14/analysis-of-december-14-2009 
-us-supreme-court-decision-regarding-chrylser-sale/ (Dec. 14, 2009, 17:04 EST). 
 10. Press Release, Secretary Paulson, supra note 4. 
 11. See Ramifications of Auto Industry Bankruptcies (Part II): Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 19, 21–23 
(2009) [hereinafter Hearing Part II] (prepared statement of Ron Bloom, Senior Advisor, United 
States Department of the Treasury). 
 12. See ProPublica–General Motors, supra note 7; ProPublica–Chrysler, supra note 8.  
 13. See In re General Motors, 407 B.R. at 480–81. The realizable value, net of costs, of the 
liquidation of GM’s assets was approximately $6 to $10 billion. Id. Total secured debt was 
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restructuring;14 (3) each participated in the Obama Administration’s 
warranty commitment plan designed to promote consumer confidence in the 
distressed manufacturers by ensuing the coverage of warranties for cars 
purchased during the restructuring period;15 (4) each restructured under the 
shield of § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code),16 explicitly, or in the 
case of GM, functionally,17 insulating the emerging companies from certain 
products liability claims;18 and (5) each voluntarily assumed products 
liabilities arising from automobiles purchased before bankruptcy involved 
in accidents occurring post-closing,19 although this last concession was only 
made after intense pressure was applied by Washington.20 
Section 363(f) of the Code enables a trustee or debtor in possession21 to 
sell assets outside the ordinary course of business “free and clear” of 
interests in those assets.22 Stripping the debtor’s property of these 
                                                                                                                 
approximately $50 billion and general unsecured liabilities were estimated at nearly $117 billion, 
without even accounting for several classes of potential claims. Id. See also Ramifications of Auto 
Industry Bankruptcies (Part III): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and 
Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 17 (2009) (joint prepared 
statement of Louann Van Der Wiele, Vice President and Associate General Counsel, Chrysler 
Group, L.L.C. and Kevyn D. Orr, Partner, Jones Day) (stating that no class of Chrysler creditors 
other than first-lien creditors would receive any value upon liquidation). 
 14. See ProPublica–General Motors, supra note 7; ProPublica–Chrysler, supra note 8. 
 15. White House, Obama Administration’s New Warranty Commitment Program (Mar. 30, 
2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Warrantee_Commitment_Program.pdf 
[hereinafter Warranty Commitment Program]. 
 16. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2006). All further references to the “Code” are to the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1330 (2006). 
 17. See Interview with J. Kent Emison, infra note 133. The GM plan does provide for 
unsecured creditors, of which pre-closing products liability claimants are a subclass. Id. However, 
given the many products liability claimants’ contingent status, the vast difference between the 
total debt due to unsecured creditors and what is provided for in the plan, and that this amount is 
to be divided among all unsecured creditors pro rata, the provision is unlikely to account for 
much, if any, relief for their substantial injuries. Id. 
 18. See Hearing Part II, supra note 11, at 22–32. 
 19. See Mike Spector, Corporate News: GM Agrees to Liability for Defects After 
Bankruptcy—Auto Maker’s Decision Comes Amid Pressure from States, Consumer Advocates in 
Advance of Tuesday Hearing, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2009, at B3, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124614495545265019.html; see also Press Release, Chrysler 
Group L.L.C., Chrysler Group to Expand Accepted Product Liability Claims (Aug. 27, 2009), 
http://www.chryslergroupllc.com/news/archive/2009/08/27/product_liability_claims.  
 20. See, e.g., Spector, supra note 19. This pressure was, in turn, generated through powerful 
lobbying efforts on the part of plaintiffs’ advocates; but it was the government’s influence, 
powerful due to the massive assistance the companies received in the bailout, which proved 
crucial to obtaining their acquiescence. Id.; see also Tomoeh Murakami Tse & Kendra Marr, GM 
to Allow Some Product Liability Claims, WASH. POST, June 29, 2009, at A11, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/28/AR2009062802466.html. 
 21. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2006) (“Subject to . . . limitations . . . a debtor in possession shall 
have all the rights . . . and powers, and shall perform all the functions and duties . . . of a trustee 
serving in a case under this chapter.”). 
 22. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2006) (“The trustee may sell property under subsection (b) or (c) of 
this section free and clear of any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate . . .” 
subject to certain restrictions.).  
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encumbrances encourages buyers to pay a premium price well above what 
the assets would receive in liquidation in a way that, in theory, produces a 
more efficient result than a standard Chapter 11 reorganization plan.23 
However, commentators have argued that § 363(f) was intended to perform 
this function within the context of a fully negotiated plan and that allowing 
debtors to use it in preplan sales is an unacceptable end-run around 
reorganization, freeing purchasers from liabilities which might otherwise 
attach to assets using the standard mechanism.24 Courts, however, have not 
sided with the critics,25 and the “free and clear” provision has firmly 
ensconced § 363 as the most attractive mechanism for the sale of liability-
burdened businesses.26 It is the standard operating procedure of such sales 
that injury claims27 rest against the debtor-seller.28 The injury claims at 
issue in this note may be separated into a tripartite framework of injuries 
arising from products purchased before the debtor filed for bankruptcy: 
those that were involved in accidents that occurred (1) prepetition; (2) 
during pendency; and (3) post-closing (so-called “future claims”). 
It is this note’s position that the federal government, in providing 
bankruptcy-anticipatory bailout monies to these companies under TARP, 
made a perverse—yet correctable—policy choice to preserve its own 
investment in the automobile industry by choosing to promote consumer 
confidence in the automakers while neglecting to protect accident victims 
whose interests in recovery would be severely curtailed by the provisions of 
§ 363. It exerted pressure on the companies to assume future claim liability 
for accidents arising from cars purchased prepetition, but without insisting 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Jason Brege, Note, An Efficiency Model of Section 363(b) Sales, 92 VA. L. REV. 1639, 
1655–73 (2006) (arguing that optimizing efficiency in § 363 sales can be a function of locating the 
appropriate level of judicial oversight in such sales). 
 24. George W. Kuney, Misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code Section 363(f) and Undermining the 
Chapter 11 Process, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235, 236. (2002) (showing that courts have, for the most 
part, interpreted “interests” in this provision to include “claims,” and more specifically, unsecured 
claims like products liability claims, which are normally disposed of through the normal course 
and application of a Chapter 11 reorganization plan, but which may sometimes attach to the assets 
themselves and thus fall upon the purchaser through the application of successor liability 
principles). 
 25. See id. at 236. Despite Professor Kuney’s textual critique, 
[b]ankruptcy courts . . . have chosen not to follow the plain meaning of § 363(f), but 
instead to interpret that subsection’s words “any interest” to mean “any claim or 
interest” so as to give the debtor or trustee the same power to sell prior to plan 
confirmation as that under a confirmed plan, and to strip off liens, claims and other 
interests in the process. 
Id. (citations omitted).  
 26. Id. at 267 (“[T]he dominant interpretation is that § 363(f) can be used to sell property free 
and clear of claims that could otherwise be assertable against the buyer of the assets under the 
common law doctrine of successor liability.”). 
 27. “Injury claims,” as a subset of “claims,” are herein defined as claims which derive from 
product liability principles or from a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.  
 28. See Kuney, supra note 24, at 267.  
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on the provision of similar protection to prepetition and pendency 
claimants. The federal government’s choices—massive public investment, 
resort to the liability shield of § 363, and selective mitigation of its effects 
for only certain classes of similarly situated claimants—have thus produced 
an arbitrary and unacceptable result that will allow some claimants, but not 
others, to recover based entirely on when their injuries occurred. 
Part I of this note will discuss the § 363 process, focusing particularly 
on the policy reasons for the “free and clear” provision and some of the 
counterarguments. Part II will describe the GM and Chrysler bankruptcies 
themselves: the background leading to their potential insolvency, and the 
federal government’s measures under both the Presidential Task Force on 
the Auto Industry (Task Force) and the bailout designed to stave off their 
liquidation. Part III will outline the current legal status of the four primary 
companies emerging from the § 363 sales (Old GM, New GM, Old 
Chrysler, and New Chrysler) with respect to the disposition of assets and 
the assignment of products liabilities for prepetition claims, claims during 
pendency, and future claims. Part IV will discuss the policy considerations 
informing the federal government’s decision to intervene in the automobile 
industry crisis, how those decisions militate toward a vision of the 
automakers’ restructuring as primarily policy-based, and why, given that 
vision and the automakers’ voluntary assumption of future claims liability, 
the extinguishment or practical inconsequence of prepetition and pendency 
products liability claims is unacceptable. Finally, Part V will present and 
discuss options open to GM, Chrysler, and the policy-makers in the Obama 
Administration and the Treasury Department that may produce a more 
equitable result. 
I. OVERVIEW OF § 363 SALES 
Central to both GM’s and Chrysler’s plans for reorganization was the 
asset sale process afforded to debtors under § 363 of the Code.29 
Contextualizing the operation of § 363 within Chapter 11 requires a brief 
discussion of the reorganization process itself. 
A. CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZATION: PRESERVING GOING CONCERN 
VALUE 
Historically, a primary function of Chapter 11 reorganization has been 
to free a distressed, but valuable, business from liabilities attached to its 
assets so as to preserve it as a going concern.30 The concept of “going 
                                                                                                                 
 29. See In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 473 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Chrysler 
L.L.C., 405 B.R. 84, 94 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated as 
moot sub nom. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler L.L.C., 130 S.Ct. 1015 (2009); see also 
11 U.S.C. § 363 (2006).  
 30. See Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization Remain a 
Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First Century?, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 153, 
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concern value” derived from eighteenth century railroad receiverships as 
the model for modern bankruptcy.31 That model developed because the 
assets of insolvent railroad companies (e.g., miles of track, railroad cars, 
etc.) were close to valueless without the superstructure of a functioning 
railway system.32 Given that a core concern of bankruptcy is the retention of 
the maximum value of the debtor’s assets, that goal in the railroad context 
meant establishing the concept of going concern value.33 One commentator 
has distilled a simple (if somewhat reductive) rule: When the value of a 
firm’s assets exceeds the value those assets would garner in liquidation, the 
goals of the Code are best served by the firm’s continuing operation.34 
B. CHAPTER 11: THE REORGANIZATION PLAN 
Chapter 11 traditionally accomplishes the goal of preserving and 
maximizing value through the mechanism of the reorganization plan,35 an 
involved process that often, in the case of large companies, requires several 
years to complete.36 During this process, the Code provides a variety of 
mechanisms for the disposal of debtors’ and creditors’ various interests.37 
The debtor is aided by such devices as the power to reject executory 
contracts,38 the automatic stay of actions against her,39 and the right to 
propose the plan of reorganization.40 Creditors are afforded, among other 
things, the right to commence an involuntarily Chapter 11 proceeding 
against the debtor,41 the right to participate in and consent to the 
reorganization plan,42 due process rights,43 and the protection that their best 
interests44 be served by the reorganization plan.45 The primary object of this 
                                                                                                                 
154 (2004); see also Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 
580 (1998) (discussing the conflict between two axiomatic approaches, traditionalist and 
proceduralist, to bankruptcy policy in the context of Chapter 11, but averring that any approach 
must accept that “Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code helps ensure that firms in distress survive”). 
 31. See Miller & Waisman, supra note 30, at 160–66. 
 32. See id. at 164. 
 33. See id. at 165. 
 34. Omer Tene, Revisiting the Creditor’s Bargain: The Entitlement to the Going-Concern 
Surplus in Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 19 BANKR. DEV. J. 287, 292 (2003). Tene 
explains that “[i]f . . . the firm [will] be viable despite its financial distress, the firm is reorganized 
and it continues to operate as a going-concern.” Id. The article further states: “[W]e subscribe to 
the view that bankruptcy law . . . must seek to maximize the going-concern value of the assets of 
the debtor . . . .” Id. at 294 (citations omitted).  
 35. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121–1129 (2006). 
 36. See, e.g., Brege, supra note 23, at 1637, 1639; Kuney, supra note 24, at 236–37. 
 37. Miller & Waisman, supra note 30, at 177. 
 38. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2006). 
 39. Id. § 362.  
 40. Id. § 1121. 
 41. Id. § 303. 
 42. Id. § 1126. 
 43. Id. § 102. 
 44. See Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636, 649 (2d 
Cir. 1988) (interpreting 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) to provide that a plan passes that section’s “best 
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process is to balance all parties’ interests with the larger policies that 
undergird bankruptcy law: the preservation of value and the prevention of 
inefficient economic dislocation.46 These policies provide a sort of 
overriding philosophical template through which the corporate 
reorganization is to be administered. Ideally, the plan should operate to 
reorganize the company efficiently, and to maximize the overall value of 
the estate’s assets.47 
C. SECTION 363: ASSET SALES DESIGNED TO MAXIMIZE VALUE 
Pre-confirmation § 363 asset sales in Chapter 1148 theoretically operate 
as a streamlining method for preserving the maximum value of the assets of 
a deeply distressed corporation.49 As the primary goal of Chapter 11 is to 
retain maximum value for assets, often those assets are worth more before a 
lengthy plan of reorganization is consummated.50 This is especially true for 
large companies. Often, a large business in Chapter 11 is bleeding money at 
a substantial rate for many of the same reasons for which it filed for 
bankruptcy protection, such as paralyzing pension obligations and other 
agency costs, but which are not necessarily related to the value of its 
assets.51 For large, financially distressed businesses like GM and Chrysler, 
this bleeding may be caused by enormous contract, salary, and pension 
obligations, coupled with shrinking market share and depleted 
creditworthiness that can make such obligations even harder to satisfy.52 
Section 363, therefore, was intended to operate within Chapter 11 to 
provide the trustee with the power to sell assets outside the normal course 
of business when they are “of a perishable nature or liable to deteriorate in 
value.”53 As most businesses in Chapter 11 qualify as “distressed” in one 
                                                                                                                 
interest test” if creditors are no worse off than they would have been in a liquidation under 
Chapter 7); David Gray Carlson, Indemnity, Liability, Insolvency, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1951, 
1959 (2004) (explaining 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A) provides that “when a plan is actually 
confirmed, it must give every creditor at least what she would have received in [C]hapter 7”). 
 45. See Miller & Waisman, supra note 30, at 176–77. 
 46. Brege, supra note 23, at 1640. 
 47. Bonner Mall P’ship v. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. (In re Bonner Mall P’ship), 2 F.3d 899, 
916 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[S]uccessful debtor reorganization and maximization of the value of the 
estate are the primary purposes [of Chapter 11].”) (citations omitted). 
 48. See Brege, supra note 23, at 1648 (explaining that “section [363(b)] applies to Chapters 7, 
11, 12 and 13 of the Code”). 
 49. See Robert E. Steinberg, The Seven Deadly Sins in §363 Sales, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 
2005, at 22. 
 50. See, e.g., In re Chrysler L.L.C., 405 B.R. 84, 95 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 576 F.3d 
108 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated as moot sub nom. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler L.L.C., 
130 S.Ct. 1015 (2009) (explaining that the most important factor in determining when the resort to 
§ 363 is the product of sound business judgment is “whether the asset is increasing or decreasing 
in value”) (citation omitted).  
 51. See Brege, supra note 23, at 1653–58. 
 52. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 3, at 1, 5. 
 53. Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1066 
(2d Cir. 1983). 
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way or another, § 363 asset sales have largely replaced the more costly and 
time-consuming process of confirming standard Chapter 11 reorganization 
plans.54 While commentators and jurists debate the correct interpretation of 
“interests” under the “free and clear” provision of § 363(f),55 the popularity 
of these asset sales has stemmed primarily from the enormous insulation 
from liability that the subsection affords and the generally broad 
interpretation given to it by the courts.56 That debate has sought to reconcile 
the provisions of § 363(b)57 and (f), governing the trustee’s power to 
conduct sales of substantially all the assets of the estate outside the ordinary 
course of business, with the provisions of correlative sections of the Code 
governing the use of such sales58 within the more deliberative context of a 
reorganization plan.59 
1. The Minority Position: A Conservative Reading of § 363 
Early in the jurisprudential history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978,60 courts were loath to extend the protection of § 363’s liability shield 
in sales of substantially all the assets of the debtor’s estate,61 except in the 
                                                                                                                 
 54. See Kuney, supra note 24, at 236. 
 55. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2006) (“The trustee may sell property under subsection (b) or (c) of 
this section free and clear of any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate . . . .”); 
see also In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 500–05 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (explaining 
that the debate has focused primarily on whether “interests” within this section implicates 
“claims” and specifically those claims which may otherwise attach to a purchaser in a 
reorganization plan under successor liability principles).  
  There may be strong textual and doctrinal reasons for a narrow definition of “interests” 
under § 363(f). See Kuney, supra note 24; Steinberg, supra note 49; see also Christopher M.E. 
Painter, Note, Tort Creditor Priority in the Secured Credit System: Asbestos Times, the Worse of 
Times, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1080–83 (1984) (arguing that the situation of tort creditors as a 
subclass of unsecured creditors leads to economically inefficient results and that giving such 
claimants a superpriority may better serve the goals of efficiency and fairness). These arguments 
have not, for the most part, carried the day. See In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d. 283, 
288–90 (3d Cir. 2003); George W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 19, 
109 n.398 (2004). 
 56. See Bryant P. Lee, Note, Chapter 18? Imagining Future Uses of 11 U.S.C. § 363 to 
Accomplish Chapter 7 Liquidation Goals in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 520, 530–31 (2009) (“These objections have begun to approach irrelevancy . . . . [T]he 
volume of this type of disposition of reorganization proceedings has been increasing exponentially 
in recent years . . . .”). 
 57. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2006) (providing for the power of the trustee to conduct an asset 
sale outside “the ordinary course of business”). 
 58. Id. §§ 1123, 1141.  
 59. See generally Kuney, supra note 24 (outlining the arguments for and against the use of 
asset sales outside the context of the reorganization plan and arguing that a limited use of § 363 is 
more in line with the overall goals of the Code).  
 60. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended 
at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1132 (2006)).  
 61. See In re White Motor Credit Corp., 14 B.R. 584, 589–90 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981); see 
also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways), 700 F.2d 935, 
943 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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case of an “imminent loss of all assets.”62 That position was softened 
considerably by the influential decision of the Second Circuit in In re 
Lionel Corp., which eschewed a bright-line rule for the use of § 363, giving 
deference to debtors’ decisions by adopting a “business judgment” standard 
that leaves the propriety of such a sale to a case-by-case judicial 
determination.63 For the most part, courts have interpreted this business 
judgment rule liberally, allowing asset sales to proceed on assertions and 
some evidence of savings in time and money, administrative costs and the 
preservation of value.64 Critics, however, suggest that while the court in 
Lionel loosened the judicial requirements for § 363’s use, it did so by 
articulating a limiting standard and cautioning against its unfettered use.65 
The primary textual critique against the use of § 363 centers on the 
provisions of Chapter 11 itself. Because the Code allows assets to be 
rendered “free and clear of claims and interests through a process of plan 
confirmation, consummation and post-confirmation vesting,”66 and because 
the “free and clear” provision in § 363(f) explicitly insulates only 
“interest[s] in such property,”67 a strict textual interpretation seems to 
militate for the more limited vision of § 363.68 
However, courts have generally rejected this textual critique, favoring 
instead a broad reading of § 363.69 Commentators have therefore resorted to 
more doctrinal critiques of large-scale pre-confirmation asset sales to 
support their opposition to the use of § 363.70 Their main criticism has been 
that § 363 circumvents a reorganization plan process that is designed to 
manage the interests of all concerned parties and that allows the debtor to 
                                                                                                                 
 62. In re White Motor Corp., 14 B.R. at 590. 
 63. Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1069 
(2d Cir. 1983) (noting that the language of § 363 in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 differed 
from its statutory antecedents and did not explicitly require a showing of emergency or cause for 
the bankruptcy judge to wield his or her discretionary power in authorizing sales under the 
section). 
 64. See Brege, supra note 23, at 1653–54; see also Kuney, supra note 24, at 242–43 n.30 
(discussing the evolution of the soft reading of the Lionel standard, citing In re Delaware & 
Hudson Railway Co., 124 B.R. 169 (Bankr. D.Del. 1991), for one court’s liberal approach in 
suggesting that avoiding the delays attendant to a bankruptcy proceeding itself could constitute a 
sufficient business justification for resort to a § 363 asset sale). 
 65. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 56, at 528 (noting that while Lionel did, in fact, set forth a 
limiting standard, that standard was flexible and weak, and bankruptcy courts have, for the most 
part, required little business justification under it). See also DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS 
OF BANKRUPTCY 249 (4th ed. 2006) (suggesting that Lionel has generally been used as a 
permissive rather than a restrictive standard by the courts). 
 66. Kuney, supra note 24, at 239. 
 67. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 68. See Kuney, supra note 24, at 238–44. 
 69. See id. at 236. 
 70. See id. at 235, 272–86; see also Elizabeth B. Rose, Chocolate, Flowers, and § 363(B): The 
Opportunity for Sweetheart Deals Without Chapter 11 Protections, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 
249, 275–84 (2006); Craig A. Sloane, The Sub Rosa Plan of Reorganization: Side-Stepping 
Creditor Protections in Chapter 11, 16 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 37, 60–64 (1999).  
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dispose of assets while ignoring the interests of large classes of creditors.71 
Thus, the debtor is improperly afforded the benefit of Chapter 7’s efficient 
liquidation within the context of Chapter 11 in a way that unfairly favors 
secured creditors,72 and potentially insulates the debtor from the 
requirements of disclosure, creditor approval, and good faith.73 The result 
has been, in the words of one critic, the “shift[ing of] Chapter 11 from a 
process originally focused on the confirmation of a plan of reorganization 
into one making the bankruptcy courts the forum of choice for the sales of 
businesses, troubled or not.”74 Despite these condemnations, however, the 
trend has been toward a broad judicial interpretation of § 363 and a 
resultant proliferation of its use in the last two decades.75 
2. The Majority Position: A Broad Reading of § 363 
In In re General Motors Corp., Justice Gerber articulated the primary 
counterattack to the critics’ textual argument.76 While some provisions of  
§ 1123 mandate how a sale under a reorganization plan must proceed,77  
§ 363 operates within § 1123(b)(4) as a discretionary power.78 The idea is 
that only when the debtor in possession undertakes to sell assets within the 
context of the reorganization plan must she follow through with the strict 
requirements laid out in Chapter 11 in order to properly strip those assets of 
the claims and interests attached to them.79 However, the argument goes, 
Chapter 11 should not be read, and has not been read by substantial 
authority, to trump the debtor’s resort to § 363 to effectuate a sale.80 
Furthermore, the Lionel court observed that § 363 provides no textual 
impediment to the bankruptcy judge’s discretionary power to authorize such 
sales.81 
Commentators in support of pre-confirmation asset sales also argue that 
§ 363 provides for increased efficiency in the achievement of Chapter 11’s 
goals, namely the extraction of maximum value for corporate assets and the 
avoidance of the high transactional costs associated with its comprehensive 
reorganization and confirmation requirements.82 The present net value of 
assets is maximized by freeing them from successor liability and other 
                                                                                                                 
 71. See Brege, supra note 23, at 1643 (discussing the “cynical” perspective of § 363’s critics). 
 72. See Lee, supra note 56, at 524 (cataloging some arguments against the use of § 363). 
 73. See Rose, supra note 70, at 257–58. 
 74. Kuney, supra note 24, at 235. 
 75. See id. at 235–36.  
 76. In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 487 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 77. 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (2006).  
 78. In re General Motors, 407 B.R. at 486.  
 79. Id. at 486–93. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1069 
(2d Cir. 1983). 
 82. See, e.g., Brege, supra note 23, at 1655–73. 
2010] Road Closed 363 
unsecured claims.83 This is especially true for corporations with such 
enormous potential liability for those claims, that without insulating the 
assets, no buyer could be found for them.84 Furthermore, the potential 
transaction costs of a lengthy plan confirmation process can deplete the 
market value of the assets in a way that may leave creditors worse off than 
they would be under a more streamlined process.85 Finally, contrary to 
critics who see § 363 as transforming bankruptcy into an auction forum 
used to improperly insulate potential purchasers from claims attaching to a 
debtor’s assets,86 proponents argue that it achieves the Chapter 11 goal of 
allocating maximum return to creditors with greater economic efficiency.87 
In this light, § 363 simply compliments Chapter 11, which also, subject to 
more strict requirements, seeks to sell valuable assets “free and clear” of 
claims in a way that raises purchase prices and ensures greater returns to 
creditors.88 Most courts have embraced these arguments, and asset sales 
under § 363 have become common practice, subject to only the most liberal 
requirements of business judgment: effective notice to interested parties, 
fair price, and good faith on the part of the purchaser.89 Such justifications 
will serve to insulate the sale from accusations that it improperly 
“amount[s] to a sub rosa plan of reorganization.”90 
                                                                                                                 
 83. Id. at 1644. 
 84. See In re Chrysler L.L.C., 576 F.3d 108, 118–19 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated as moot sub nom. 
Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler L.L.C., 130 S.Ct. 1015 (2009) (discussing how Fiat 
S.p.A., the only interested buyer for Chrysler, insisted on an expedited transaction). 
 85. See Brege, supra note 23, at 1644. 
 86. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 751, 787–89 (2002). 
 87. See Miller & Waisman, supra note 30, at 194 (arguing that Professors Baird and 
Rasmussen, by focusing selectively on the procedural aspects of § 363 as supplanting Chapter 11, 
neglect to recognize that § 363 may function within Chapter 11 and help to achieve its goals more 
efficiently). 
 88. Id. 
 89. See, e.g., In re Decora Indus., Inc. 2002 WL 32332749, *2–3 (D. Del. 2002) (citing In re 
Del. & Hudson Ry. Co., 124 B.R. 169, 176 (D.Del. 1991)). 
 90. In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 491 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); see also In re 
Braniff Airways, 700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983) (“The debtor and the Bankruptcy Court should 
not be able to short circuit the requirements of Chapter 11 for confirmation of a reorganization 
plan by establishing the terms of the plan sub rosa in connection with the sale of assets.”). While 
the language in Braniff seems to strongly implicate § 363, Judge Jacobs noted in Chrysler that the 
Braniff court meant only sales that were specifically designed to “evade or subvert” were 
impermissible when the terms of the sale specify ex ante the terms of a subsequent plan. In re 
Chrysler L.L.C., 576 F.3d 108, 117–18, 117 n.9 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated as moot sub nom. Ind. 
State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler L.L.C., 130 S.Ct. 1015 (2009). In essence, the court in 
Chrysler (as well as Judge Gerber, who followed the same reasoning in General Motors) limited 
the reach of the sub rosa exception to the very narrow set of facts of Braniff. Id.; In re General 
Motors 407 B.R. at 496–98. Accordingly, the sub rosa exception is satisfied by the prongs of the 
“good business reason” test the bankruptcy court uses to judge the sale as a whole. See Motorola, 
Inc. v. Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors & JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Iridium), 
478 F.3d 452, 466–67 n.21 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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II. THE GM AND CHRYSLER BANKRUPTCIES 
A. THE ROAD TO INSOLVENCY 
Perhaps no industry in the United States has been hit as hard by the 
economic downturn as the automobile manufacturing sector. By late 
Summer 2008, the Wall Street Journal was already reporting that “the U.S. 
auto industry has slipped into its worst crisis in decades” and that 
“[a]nalysts have warned [that] GM, Ford, and Chrysler are all in danger of 
running short of cash.”91 Debate has since raged as to the core causes of the 
industry’s woes. Environmentalists and critics of U.S. energy policy have 
insisted that the rising price of oil in the mid-to-latter part of the decade, as 
well as the U.S. automakers’ apparent refusal to embrace fuel efficiency, 
led to the industry’s decline and injured the economy as a whole.92 Some 
have blamed the intransigence of labor unions and the breadth of 
obligations to current and former employees as severely disadvantaging 
domestic automakers in an era of free trade and comparative advantage.93 
Others have pointed to gross mismanagement in the upper echelons of 
power at both companies.94 All of this took place amid an overall economic 
downturn that saw a sharp decline in demand.95 
Of course, there can be no one root cause for a precipitous decline that 
saw an over 40% drop in sales in 2008 for both Chrysler and GM,96 that 
saw GM’s market share drop from 45% in 1980 to a projected 19.5% in 
                                                                                                                 
 91. John D. Stoll, Stephen Power & Corey Boles, Auto Executives to Seek Government Help, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2008, at A3, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12208351 
5707008703.html. 
 92. Posting of Keith Johnson to the Wall Street Journal Environmental Capital Blog, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/environmentalcapital/2009/04/22/oil-shock-did-high-oil-prices-cause-the-
recession/tab/article/ (Apr. 22, 2009, 10:48 EDT). 
 93. Mitt Romney, Op-Ed., Let Detroit Go Bankrupt, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2008, at A35, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/19/opinion/19romney.html. As of the time it filed 
for bankruptcy, Chrysler had 38,500 domestic employees (of which 27,600 were covered by 
collective bargaining) and provided healthcare and other benefits to over 100,000 retirees. In re 
Chrysler, 405 B.R. 84, 88–89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated 
as moot sub nom. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler L.L.C., 130 S.Ct. 1015 (2009). 
 94. Steven Rattner, The Auto Bailout: How We Did It, FORTUNE, Nov. 9, 2009, at 55. Steven 
Rattner, head of President Obama’s Task Force, emphasized the more arrogant and defiant aspects 
of the automakers’ corporate cultures as indicative of a stasis in their organizational management 
systems that infected every aspect of their businesses, but was particularly harmful to their finance 
operations. Id. 
 95. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 3, at 5. 
U.S. automobile sales fell to a 26-year low, from a high point of 17.3 million cars and 
light trucks in 2000 to 13.2 million in 2008. Sales fell much further in the first half of 
2009 as a result of deteriorating economic conditions and are projected to be roughly 
10.3 million units for 2009 and 11.1 million in 2010. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 96. See Ortolani, supra note 2. 
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2009,97 and that saw, in 2008, the “Big Three”—GM, Chrysler, and Ford 
Motor Company—account for less than 50% of the total domestic market 
for the first time since foreign manufacturers began competing with them in 
earnest in the early 1990s.98 Each of these industry problems are worthy of 
some blame. 
B. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE 
In response to the crisis facing the automobile manufacturing industry, 
Treasury Secretary Paulson announced the government’s intention to bail 
out the industry with some of the money set aside by Congress to stabilize 
the imploding financial sector.99 Continuing this commitment, President 
Obama, in the early days of his administration, established the Task 
Force.100 Based in part on the Task Force’s findings, the administration 
developed comprehensive plans for the government-assisted rescue and 
reorganization of GM and Chrysler.101  
While the putative goal of the bailout was to guide the automakers 
toward long-term financial viability, there was ample evidence that such a 
mission was possibly quixotic.102 Indeed, President Obama’s Task Force 
was deeply torn on the wisdom of saving Chrysler, especially considering 
the government’s enormous investment in GM, a Chrysler competitor.103 
However, GM and Chrysler were companies seen as “too big to fail,” in 
that their insolvency created a potentially disastrous ripple effect in the 
economy, “impos[ing] great harm on vendors and other interrelated 
businesses . . . causing cascading business failures and layoffs.”104 The 
potential job losses, cited by the court in GM, numbered in the hundreds of 
thousands.105 In addition to unemployment and interrelated business 
failures, the possibility of the government having to take over the 
companies’ pension and healthcare obligations was extremely daunting.106 
Based on these startling projections, it appears the decision to bail out GM 
                                                                                                                 
 97. In re General Motors, 407 B.R. 463, 476 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 98. See Ortolani, supra note 2. 
 99. See Press Release, Secretary Paulson, supra note 4. 
 100. See Rattner, supra note 94. 
 101. See id. (claiming that the findings of the Task Force did not necessarily support a 
conclusion that the automakers’ viability merited what would be a huge government investment in 
their respective futures, but that other policy considerations militated for the bailout). 
 102. See Hearing Part II, supra note 11, at 19–20. 
 103. Rattner, supra note 94.  
 104. Kuney & St. James, supra note 6, at 73 (arguing that Chapter 11 reorganization is ill-suited 
to the particular problems inhering in too-big-to-fail bankruptcies and that Chapter 10 can and 
should be amended to solve them). 
 105. In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 477 n.6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 106. Id. at 483. 
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and Chrysler was one couched in politics and macroeconomics rather than 
being based on the real lasting economic viability of either company.107 
GM and Chrysler’s paths during the bailout differed in certain salient 
respects. Due to its smaller size, Chrysler was able to locate, at least in part, 
a private purchaser in Fiat, S.p.A. (Fiat, operating in conjunction with other 
purchasers as New CarCo Acquisition LLC, or New Chrysler108).109 
However, GM’s sale, which was between two and three times larger than 
Chrysler’s, could only be accomplished through the creation of a Treasury 
Department-sponsored purchaser, Vehicle Acquisition Holdings LLC (New 
GM),110 using TARP funds as an equity investment in New GM rather than 
encumbering it with a massive debt repayment obligation post sale.111 
Between December 28, 2008 and July 10, 2009 the federal government 
loaned or invested nearly $51 billion in GM.112 Between January 2, 2009 
and May 27, 2009, the federal government loaned or invested nearly $13 
billion in Chrysler.113 While some payments were made prior to the 
companies’ bankruptcy filings, they were predicated on the submission of 
restructuring reports from both automakers that contemplated resorting to  
§ 363 asset sales from the start.114 
III. THE GM AND CHRYSLER BANKRUPTCIES 
Sales of substantial portions of company assets—those conducted 
preplan under § 363(b) as well as those authorized as part of § 1141(c) 
reorganization plans—generally result in the emergence of two separate 
                                                                                                                 
 107. The appropriateness of the government’s decision to rescue GM and Chrysler is beyond 
the scope of this Note; however, Part IV will argue that certain consequences and equitable 
considerations should properly flow from the manner in which these policy choices were 
effectuated.  
 108. New CarCo, or New Chrysler, is a limited liability Delaware corporation formed to 
accomplish the goals of the Fiat Alliance—a term-sheet alliance that initially arranged for certain 
considerations, such as a distribution network, to flow from Fiat to Chrysler in exchange for a 
35% equity stake in Chrysler, but that matured into the purchaser entity for the accomplishment of 
the § 363 sale. In re Chrysler L.L.C., 405 B.R. 84, 91–92 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 576 F.3d 
108 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated as moot, sub nom. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler L.L.C., 
130 S.Ct. 1015 (2009).  
 109. Id. 
 110. In re General Motors, 407 B.R. at 473, 480–81. 
 111. See Rattner, supra note 94.  
 112. See ProPublica–General Motors, supra note 7. 
 113. See ProPublica–Chrysler, supra note 8. 
 114. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Obama Administration Auto 
Restructuring Initiative: Chrysler-Fiat Alliance (Apr. 30, 2009), http://www.financialstability.gov/ 
docs/AIFP/Chrysler-restructuring-factsheet_043009.pdf [hereinafter Fact Sheet, Chrysler] (“To 
execute this agreement, Chrysler will use [§] 363 . . . to clear away the remaining impediments to 
its successful re-launch.”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Obama 
Administration Auto Restructuring Initiative: General Motors Restructuring (June 1, 2009), 
http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/05312009_gm-factsheet.html [hereinafter Fact Sheet, GM] 
(“To effectuate its plan, General Motors will use [§] 363 . . . to clear away the remaining 
impediments to its successful re-launch.”). 
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corporate entities with their own distinct asset and liability profiles.115 The 
four companies that emerged from the GM and Chrysler bankruptcy 
proceedings were Old GM, New GM,116 Old Chrysler, and New Chrysler.117 
Since the two deals differed in their details, a brief outline of the ownership 
of each, with particular attention paid to their legal obligations regarding 
products liabilities, is called for. It will be beneficial to first discuss GM’s 
bankruptcy and then use it as departure point for comparison with 
Chrysler’s. 
A. OLD GM / NEW GM 
As the purchaser, New GM emerged from the § 363 sale and 
subsequent litigation with substantially all the assets of Old GM,118 but 
shielded from all liabilities not expressly assumed in its Master Sale and 
Purchase Agreement (MPA).119 New GM assumed liabilities for both 
companies’ recall and warranty commitments, certain employment-related 
obligations arising from the assumed benefit plans covered under the 
United Auto Workers (UAW) collective bargaining agreement (CBA), and 
products liability claims for injuries that occurred after the sale’s closing 
arising from automobiles purchased pre-closing.120 These last two 
categories of liabilities—those related to employee benefits under the CBA 
and the expansion of products liability for future claims arising from cars 
purchased not only from New GM, but also Old GM—were assumed at the 
insistence of both the Treasury Department121 and the Obama 
Administration.122 The implication, particularly with regard to the 
                                                                                                                 
 115. This statement is subject to limitations that are beyond the scope of this Note. For further 
discussions on issues such as successor liability, the propriety of cleaving assets from corporate 
liabilities, and other concerns, see William T. Bodoh & Michelle M. Morgan, Inequality Among 
Creditors: The Unconstitutional Use of Successor Liability to Create a New Class of Priority 
Claimants, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 325 (1996); George W. Kuney, Bankruptcy and Recovery 
of Tort Damages, 71 TENN. L. REV. 81 (2003); George W. Kuney, supra note 24; J. Maxwell 
Tucker, The Clash of Successor Liability Principles, Reorganization Law, and the Just Demand 
that Relief Be Afforded Unknown and Unknowable Claimants, 12 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 8–9 (1995). 
See also Lawrence P. Schnapf, CERCLA and the Substantial Continuity Test: A Unifying Proposal 
for Imposing CERCLA Liability Asset on Purchasers, 4 ENVTL. LAW. 435, 493 n.401 (1998) 
(discussing how the economic benefits of selling assets free and clear of liabilities may implicitly 
serve the goals of the Code).  
 116. In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 477 n.6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).  
 117. In re Chrysler L.L.C., 405 B.R. 84, 91 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2009), aff’d, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 
2009), vacated as moot sub nom. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler L.L.C., 130 S.Ct. 
1015 (2009). 
 118. In re General Motors, 407 B.R. at 473, 480–81. 
 119. Id. at 481–82.  
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. at 478 (discussing some of the Treasury Department’s prerequisites for GM, such as 
committing to the provision of funds to support UAW beneficiaries, as well as other commitments 
to bring its employment-related obligations more in line with industry standards). 
 122. See Spector, supra note 19 (noting GM’s willing assumption of future claims products 
liabilities was not exactly “willing,” as it was a result of pressure from the Obama Administration 
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assumption of products liabilities, is that without this voluntary 
commitment, these claims would have been reserved to Old GM as standard 
operating procedure under the “free and clear” provision of § 363(f).123 
Indeed, the claims retained by Old GM include, among others, products 
liability claims (“to the extent they weren’t assumed by reason of the 
change in the MPA”)124 and warranty-of-merchantability-derived liabilities 
for all cars purchased pre-closing arising from accidents occurring 
prepetition and during pendency.125 
Under the MPA, New GM’s common stock would be divided among 
various parties, with the bulk of ownership reserved to the Treasury 
Department.126 This structure has two unusual aspects. First, the vast 
majority of ownership in New GM is reserved to an arm of the Federal 
Government127 (with a lesser stake in ownership reserved for an arm of the 
Canadian Government),128 historically an uncommon purchaser in § 363 
sales and, arguably, one not envisioned by the Code.129 Second, an 
ownership stake was provided to the debtor, Old GM, for the benefit of its 
general unsecured creditors.130 Although a significant amount of money was 
                                                                                                                 
and other interested parties despite GM’s continued insistence that it was not legally required to 
do so under the rules governing these kinds of asset sales). 
 123. See discussion supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the inclusion of “claims” with the definition of 
“interests” under jurisprudential interpretations of § 363(f)). 
 124. In re General Motors, 407 B.R. 463, 482 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that GM 
amended its MPA after filing to include claims arising from accidents before closing). The 
implication is that without New GM assuming these liabilities, they would be part of the broader 
category of “excluded liabilities” to be retained by Old GM. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 482–83. Atop the hierarchy would sit the Treasury Department, owning nearly 61% 
of New GM’s common stock, undiluted, as well as just over $2 billion in Class A Preferred Stock. 
Id. at 482. Of the undiluted common stock, 17.5% would be owned by a New Employees’ 
Beneficiary Trust, which would also take possession of $6.5 billion in Class A Preferred Stock, as 
well as a six-year warrant to purchase an additional 2.5% of the common stock. Id. A Canadian 
Governmental instrument, Export Development Canada, provided additional bailout financing to 
GM, contributing $3 billion and committing to an additional $6 billion in exchange for nearly 
12% equity in the form of New GM undiluted common stock and $400 million in Class A 
Preferred Stock. Id. Finally, Old GM was given, in consideration of the § 363 asset sale to New 
GM, 10% ownership of New GM undiluted common stock as well as a commitment by New GM 
for an additional 2% if Old GM’s unsecured claims, of which products liability claims are a 
subcategory, were to exceed $35 billion. Id. at 483. 
 127. Id. at 482. (stating that the Treasury Department “will own 60.8% of New GM’s common 
stock on an undiluted basis”). 
 128. Id. (Export Development Canada, a company created by the governments of Canada and 
Ontario “will own 11.7% of New GM’s common stock on an undiluted basis.”). 
 129. See Ramifications of Auto Industry Bankruptcies (Part I), Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 75–81 (2009) (testimony and prepared statement of David A. Skeel, S. 
Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School) (arguing that 
the intrusion of the Federal Government into these bankruptcies combined with the use of § 363 
amounted to “sham” sales common in the early days of railroad receiverships, but curtailed by the 
New Deal reforms).  
 130. In re General Motors, 407 B.R. at 483 (“Old GM will own 10% of New GM’s common 
stock on an undiluted basis.”). 
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reserved for this fund in numeric terms, the proceeds from this stake will be 
divided among all of Old GM’s unsecured creditors on a pro rata basis.131 
Given GM’s “assumed $116.5 billion in general unsecured claims,”132 the 
real recovery afforded to excluded products liability claimants under this 
scheme will, in practice, amount to pennies on the dollar.133 For a seriously 
injured victim such recovery is functionally meaningless, and a secondary 
market for these claims has already sprung up with plaintiffs being offered 
no more than 15–20% of the value of their claims.134 
B. OLD CHRYSLER / NEW CHRYSLER 
New Chrysler’s consideration, provided to Old Chrysler in exchange 
for substantially all of the latter’s assets, consisted of $2 billion in cash and 
New Chrysler’s assumption of “certain liabilities.”135 An employee-benefit 
entity created by the UAW union (VEBA) would emerge with roughly 68% 
of New Chrysler’s stock and a membership interest of 55%.136 While an 
additional $10.96 billion in financing for the deal was provided by the 
Treasury Department and Export Development Canada137 in return for an 
equity stake in New Chrysler,138 such governmental ownership was not 
envisioned by this agreement to have, as in the case of New GM, lasting 
effect.139 Indeed, the two asset sales differ primarily because a viable 
purchaser for Old Chrysler’s assets emerged from the private sector140 while 
GM’s liabilities were so great that governmental ownership control was the 
                                                                                                                 
 131. See Hearing Part II, supra note 11, at 23 (“Unsecured creditors will receive 10% of the 
equity in New GM . . . . This includes pre-petition product liability claim holders, who will 
receive their pro-rata share of the disposition of the unsecured creditors’ consideration.”). 
 132. In re General Motors, 407 B.R. at 481 (noting that this estimate is, in all likelihood, a 
conservative one that does not account for several classes of potential claims, such as contract 
rejection and pension termination claims). 
 133. Interview with J. Kent Emison, Founding Partner, Langdon & Emison, in Lexington, Mo. 
(Oct. 27, 2009) (on file with author). A hypothetical plaintiff is likely to get between 1 and 10% of 
the expected value of his claim, in the form of New GM stock, based on his pro rata share of the 
ownership stake set aside in the agreement. Id.  
 134. Id. Plaintiffs often feel compelled to accept settlements from GM and on the secondary 
market in amounts that are often negligible compared to their injuries. Id. This stems from a 
justifiable fear that the recovery provided to them pro rata under the 10% stake in New GM as 
general unsecured creditors will be even less. Id.  
 135. In re Chrysler L.L.C., 405 B.R. 84, 92 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 576 F.3d 108 (2d 
Cir. 2009), vacated as moot sub nom. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler L.L.C., 130 S.Ct. 
1015 (2009) (describing some of the terms set out in the April 30, 2009 Master Transaction 
Agreement (MTA) governing the § 363 sale). 
 136. Id. at 90. 
 137. In re Chrysler L.L.C., 576 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (explaining that these entities 
agreed to provide $4.96 billion in sixty-day debtor in possession financing and an additional $6 
billion in senior secured financing). 
 138. Id. (noting that the Treasury Department would emerge with 8% ownership membership 
interest and Export Development Canada with 2%). 
 139. See In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 482–83 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 140. In re Chrysler, 405 B.R. at 90–92. 
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only alternative to liquidation.141 To that end, the Chrysler agreement sets 
out procedures by which Fiat could turn its 20% equity stake in New 
Chrysler into a 51% holding.142 This maturation is predicated on New 
Chrysler repaying, in full, debts it owed to the governmental entities whose 
ownership stakes would be the first to flow to Fiat, with the remainder 
deriving from a purchase of shares from VEBA.143 This structure is, by 
design, intended to accomplish the eventual transfer of a controlling 
ownership share to Fiat through the temporary use of governmental loans 
providing sustained viability through the transitional period.144 
The prime classes of liabilities assumed by New Chrysler as part of the 
agreement were warranty, return, and rebate obligations for all Chrysler 
automobiles purchased prior to the closing.145 All products liability claims 
were, under the “free and clear” terms of § 363(f), to be reserved to Old 
Chrysler.146 These included all past, pending, and future products liability 
claims arising from cars purchased before the sale was accomplished.147 
Unlike New GM, which assumed the future claims liability in its asset sale 
proper,148 New Chrysler voluntarily assumed such liability well after its 
asset sale was consummated.149 While New Chrysler pointed to its 
unanticipated new viability as the central reason for its assumption of future 
claims liability,150 it had previously fought against it.151 GM’s assumption 
                                                                                                                 
 141. In re General Motors, 407 B.R. at 480–81. 
 142. In re Chrysler, 405 B.R. at 92. Fiat’s ownership would mature to 35% “[u]pon the 
reaching of certain milestones” and to 51% based on a right to purchase the requisite additional 
16%. Id. at 192 n.11; see also Hearing Part II, supra note 11, at 19 (explaining that the 
administration’s willingness to provide financial assistance to these companies was predicated on 
them restructuring in such a way as to “not require ongoing government assistance”). 
 143. In re Chrysler, 405 B.R. at 92 n.11. 
 144. See id. (highlighting provisions for the accrual of majority of ownership by Fiat). 
 145. See Todd Blodgett, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., The Status of Product Liability, Warranty 
and Lemon Law Claims for New GM and Chrysler, http://www.consumerlaw.org/ 
autobankruptcies/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 12, 2010) (reporting that section 2.08(g) of the 
MTA also provides for New Chrysler’s assumption of liability for actions under state lemon laws 
and honoring of product safety recalls).  
 146. See id. (“New Chrysler initially disclaimed any liability for product liability claims 
involving vehicles manufactured and sold by Old Chrysler prior to [the closing date].”). 
 147. See id. 
 148. In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 481 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 149. Letter from John T. Bozzella, Vice President, Chrysler L.L.C., to U.S. Senators Richard 
Durbin, Patrick Leahy, Arlen Specter & Herb Kohl (Aug. 27, 2009), available at 
http://www.autosafety.org/sites/default/files/ChryslerLettertoSenators.pdf [hereinafter Bozzella 
Letter]. 
 150. Id. (“Today, Chrysler Group has a much better appreciation of the viability of our business 
than it did on June 10. As a result . . . the company will accept product liability claims on vehicles 
manufactured by [Old Chrysler] before June 10 that are involved in accidents on or after that 
date.”). 
 151. Brief for Appellee Chrysler Financial Services Americas L.L.C. in Support of Apellees 
Chrysler L.L.C. et al., In re Chrysler L.L.C., 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated as moot, sub 
nom. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler L.L.C., 130 S.Ct. 1015 (2009) (No. 09-2311-mb) 
(arguing that § 363 and its jurisprudential interpretation compels a finding that the debtor’s assets 
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of liability under its MPA was public record and New Chrysler was surely 
aware of it. Furthermore, it is curious that Chrysler’s determination of its 
present viability resulted in the assumption of liability for an unknowable 
class of claims,152 while preserving its protection from prepetition and 
pendency claims that are more readily identifiable and thus more 
susceptible to a viability assessment.153 These factors suggest that 
Chrysler’s decision was more likely a response to political pressure and the 
prospect of fighting these claims in multifarious state court actions. Despite 
the corporate largesse, however, prepetition and pendency claims remain 
the sole responsibility of Old Chrysler, an entity which, unlike Old GM,154 
has no ownership stake in the new company and thus has even fewer assets 
to cover such claims.155 
C. THE AFFECTED CLASSES LEFT WITH INSIGNIFICANT RECOVERY 
The class of prepetition and pendency products liability claimants left 
with no meaningful recovery against Old Chrysler is roughly two-fifths the 
size of Old GM’s correlative class.156 Using estimates derived primarily 
from historical averages,157 GM’s class consists of roughly 2000 people, 
500-600 of whom are likely to have serious claims, with a potential total 
liability to GM of between $1 billion and $2 billion.158 This puts Chrysler’s 
affected claimant class at roughly 800 people, with 200 to 250 being serious 
claims, resulting in $400 million to $800 million in potential liability.159 
Using the most liberal estimates, the total liability for both companies could 
fall between $3 billion and $4 billion with the class of claimants being 
between 2800 and 3000 people.160 While not inconsiderable, these figures 
represent a fraction of the total government auto bailout.161 The use of § 363 
is an unacceptable result given this discrepancy, particularly in light of the 
                                                                                                                 
are sold free and clear of all interests and that unsecured claims such as products liability claims 
fall within the meaning of “interests”). 
 152. See, e.g., Frederick Tung, Taking Future Claims Seriously: Future Claims and Successor 
Liability in Bankruptcy, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 435, 438–41 (1999). 
 153. See discussion infra Part IV.B (discussing how future claims liability for auto 
manufacturers with a long history may be more susceptible to actuarial estimation than would be 
true for companies with a less extensive products liability track record).  
 154. In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 483 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 155. Interview with J. Kent Emison, supra note 133.  
 156. Interview with Larry Coben, Founding Partner, Coben & Assoc., in Scottsdale, Ariz. (Nov. 
2, 2009) (on file with author).  
 157. Id. 
 158. See Michael Collins, Auto Liability Shield Sought GM, Chrysler Look to Evade Suits Over 
Pre-bankruptcy Cars, JOURNAL-GAZETTE, June 11, 2009, at A1, available at 
http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/torts-products-liability/12517354-1.html (noting that “GM paid 
$1.1 billion in products liability claims in 2007 and $921 million in 2008, according to a filing 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission”). 
 159. See Interview with Larry Coben, supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 160. Id.  
 161. See ProPublica–General Motors, supra note 7; ProPublica–Chrysler, supra note 8.  
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new companies’ assumption of future claims liability for accidents arising 
from what are, essentially, the same automobiles as those excluded—those 
purchased prior to closing. 
IV. PUBLIC POLICY: CONSIDERATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES  
Historically, federal bailouts of private firms have been largely ad hoc 
government reactions to threats of failure of important private 
enterprises.162 Given that a public bailout results from a balance of public 
and private considerations, the relative weight accorded those interests 
should be subject to reasoned scrutiny and analysis.163 In order to address 
these policy considerations in context, it would be helpful to first analyze 
the federal government’s approach to the automobile industry bailout of 
2008 and 2009. 
A. THE GOVERNMENT GETS INVOLVED 
In late 2008, it had become clear that the American automobile 
manufacturing industry was facing imminent insolvency and collapse.164 By 
December of that year, the Bush Administration and the Treasury 
Department announced their intention to provide government financial and 
oversight assistance to stabilize and ensure the long-term viability of the 
industry.165 Congress had ceded broad authority to the Treasury Department 
in administering TARP166 under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
of 2008 (EESA)167 “to immediately provide authority and facilities that the 
Secretary of the Treasury can use to restore liquidity and stability to the 
financial system of the United States.”168 While acknowledging that TARP 
was originally intended to authorize the Treasury Department to “stabilize 
our financial sector,” Secretary Paulson suggested that the Bush 
Administration’s position was that the auto industry’s insolvency 
                                                                                                                 
 162. Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing a Public Bailout Policy, 67 IND. 
L.J. 951, 1036 (1992) (arguing that a coherent legislative approach to bailout policy should be 
developed with a more considered approach to economic and non-economic factors, changes to 
bankruptcy laws and bankruptcy perceptions, the development of strict guidelines for the granting 
of bailouts, and a stronger regulatory regime to oversee their application). 
 163. Id. at 1037. 
 164. See, e.g., Terence Corcoran, Let Detroit Face the Music: Bailout Nothing but Government 
Nationalization, NAT’L POST, Nov. 22, 2008, at FP.1, available at http://www.financialpost.com 
/scripts/story.html?id=ee7d8c43-d1cf-4d0f-b4ad-eae2087d11a4&k=47803; Andrew Ross Sorkin, 
Begging White House for Help, N.Y. TIMES,  Oct. 28, 2008, at B1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/28/business/28sorkin.html?_r=1; Bill Vlasic & Leslie Wayne, 
Auto Suppliers Share Anxiety Over Bailout for Big Three, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2008, at B1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/12/business/12rescue.html?_r=1&hp=&adxnnl= 
1&adxnnlx=1229057602-FQtrkM/R6yTGgeW1mc9ukg. 
 165. See Press Release, Secretary Paulson, supra note 4. 
 166. Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 5211–5241 (2008). 
 167. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA), 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 5211–5261 (2008). 
 168. Id. § 5201(1). 
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contemplated a “significant [enough] disruption to our economy,” to be 
within TARP’s mandate.169 The Treasury Department, under President 
Obama, reiterated that the provision of government assistance was 
predicated on the automaker’s willingness “to fundamentally restructure, 
address prior bad business decisions, and chart a path toward a sustainable 
future.”170 
One commentator has suggested that as a precondition for the provision 
of bailout monies, companies should be required to explore bankruptcy 
options.171 Indeed, the mission of the Task Force was primarily to explore 
and influence ways to ensure that the automobile companies could 
restructure efficiently and in a way that optimized the likelihood of  
long-term financial viability independent of ongoing federal assistance or 
participation.172 For example, after determining that the viability plan 
proposed by Chrysler was inadequate, the Task Force worked with Chrysler 
to ameliorate the plan’s shortcomings and to ensure the participation of 
Fiat.173 This resulted in a plan in which the Task Force and President 
Obama determined Chrysler could achieve viability.174 In short, the 
government’s requirement that the companies provide plans for long-term 
viability and its acceptance of those plans were in clear contemplation of 
the use of bankruptcy, and specifically § 363, to achieve the bailout’s 
goals.175 
Behind the decision to bailout the automobile manufacturing industry, 
however, was a consideration of interests outside and beyond the 
straightforward goal of making GM and Chrysler work better. Two 
examples are particularly telling with respect to the interests of tort 
claimants: the Warranty Commitment Program and the “voluntary” 
assumption of future claims liability by GM within the context of its MPA 
and by Chrysler well after the conclusion of its sale. 
The Warranty Commitment Program was initiated by the Task Force 
and the Treasury Department in an effort “to give confidence to GM’s and 
Chrysler’s customers . . . regarding the outlook for the companies.”176 The 
program created an account with enough funds to cover 125% of all 
expected warranty obligations, with the automakers providing 15% in cash 
                                                                                                                 
 169. Press Release, Secretary Paulson, supra note 4. 
 170. See Hearing Part II, supra note 11, at 19. 
 171. Block, supra note 162, at 1010–11 (referring to generic Chapter 11 as a “private bailout” 
of sorts and one that should be explored before a publicly financed option is considered). 
 172. See Hearing Part II, supra note 11, at 19 (“Our role was to act as a potential investor of 
taxpayer resources, and not become involved in specific business decisions.”). 
 173. Id. at 19. 
 174. See Rattner, supra note 94. This was, however, not without controversy. The Task Force 
was essentially even-split on Chrysler’s true long-term potential for financial and commercial 
viability. See id. 
 175. See Fact Sheet, Chrysler, supra note 114; Fact Sheet, GM, supra note 114. 
 176. Hearing Part II, supra note 11, at 26. 
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and the government providing 110% in loans.177 Furthermore, the only 
warranties guaranteed were those attached to automobiles purchased during 
the restructuring period.178 If the “disaster” of liquidation, in bankruptcy 
terms, is generally thought of as the potential for the less than optimal 
distribution of value,179 the fact that warranty commitments for automobiles 
purchased during pendency would normally, in the context of a § 363 sale, 
attach only to the debtor180 demonstrates the Treasury Department’s 
commitment to circumventing bankruptcy policy when public policy favors 
a different outcome. Here, that policy was the boosting of consumer 
confidence in the restructuring companies.181 
As discussed in Part III, both GM and Chrysler voluntarily assumed 
future claims liabilities despite their freedom from such encumbrances 
under § 363(f) of the Code. This was due, in large part, to the application of 
political pressure by the Obama Administration.182 Given the Treasury 
Department’s trumpeting of § 363 as the primary vehicle for the automakers 
to “clear away the remaining impediments to its successful re-launch,”183 its 
subsequent application of political pressure to accept some liabilities 
strongly suggests a grounding in policy considerations. However, the fruits 
of such considerations should not be meted out arbitrarily.184 
                                                                                                                 
 177. See Warranty Commitment Program, supra note 15. 
 178. Id.  
 179. See Brege, supra note 23, at 1639; Tene, supra note 34, at 295. 
 180. In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 481–82 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (differentiating 
between the liabilities New GM “assumed” versus those “retained” by Old GM). The clear 
inference is that liabilities not so assumed would be retained by the debtor. See id. 
 181. See Warranty Commitment Program, supra note 15. 
 182. See Brett A. Emison Automotive Products Liability Law Blog on Lawyers.com, 
http://product-liability.lawyers.com/automotive-products-liability/blogs/archives/2129-General-
Motors-Chrysler-Accept-Liability-for-Pre-Bankruptcy-Vehicles.html (Sept. 16, 2009, 12:40 EST) 
[hereinafter Emison Blog] (asserting that GM and Chrysler’s assumptions of future claims liability 
were due, at least in part, to pressure from the federal government). 
 183. See Fact Sheet, Chrysler, supra note 114; Fact Sheet, GM, supra note 114. 
 184. Under Chevron, courts review the decisions of administrative agencies in their 
interpretation of Congressional statutes by looking first at whether the nexus between statutory 
language and congressional intent is ambiguous. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). If the expressed intent is ambiguous enough to leave 
room for agency interpretation, such interpretation is to be subject a reasonableness standard, 
which is designed to cede great deference to administrative agency decisions. See Gary Lawson, 
Outcome, Procedure and Process: Agency Duties of Explanation for Legal Conclusions, 48 
RUTGERS L. REV. 313, 317–18 (1996). While the primary issue here—the application of political 
pressure for GM and Chrysler to assume liability for future claims but not prepetition or pendency 
claims—was not, strictly speaking, a Treasury Department “decision,” it may been seen as 
administrative policy-making. It is at least arguable that the Treasury Department’s authority to 
stabilize financial markets under EESA, 12 U.S.C.A §§ 5211–5261 (2008), did not impart 
authority to the agency to ameliorate the disposition of certain (future) tort claims to the exclusion 
of others in the context of an automaker’s bailout. Even so, the Treasury Department’s actions 
would likely survive judicial scrutiny since, as Judge Jacobs pointed out in Chrysler, Congress 
ceded broad discretion to the Treasury under the EESA and TARP legislation, provided for a high 
level of legislative oversight, and thus contemplated a very low level of judicial review. In re 
Chrysler L.L.C., 576 F.3d 108, 121–23 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated as moot, sub nom. Ind. State Police 
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B. SIMILARLY SITUATED, BUT OUT IN THE COLD 
The government’s actions and decisions throughout the automotive 
industry bailout consistently led to disparate treatment of similarly situated 
owners. Under the Warranty Commitment Program, a purchaser of a GM or 
Chrysler automobile during the period of restructuring enjoyed a guarantee 
that the warranties protecting her car would be honored completely and in 
full.185 However, if the same purchaser were severely injured in the accident 
giving rise to the redemption of that warranty, she received no guarantee of 
her personal recovery, which, as an injury claim during pendency, would 
remain with the debtor—a functionally insolvent entity.186 Simply put, the 
Treasury Department was insuring the cars but not the people who would 
be injured by them.187 This is a perverse result, particularly given the 
Treasury Department’s explicit policy rationale for establishing the program 
was to promote consumer confidence in purchasing these automobiles.188 
Committing over $640 million to insure the automobiles contemplates a 
significant likelihood that a number of them would be involved in 
accidents. It is absurd to imagine that no one would be injured in these 
vehicles, and capitalizing on the public’s failure to recognize this difference 
is ethically questionable. 
Furthermore, the government’s application of pressure upon GM189 and 
Chrysler190 to assume future claims liabilities for injuries arising from 
automobiles purchased prepetition and during pendency produces a 
similarly arbitrary result. For example, someone suffering an injury arising 
from a manufacturing defect in an Old GM or Old Chrysler automobile can 
expect a meaningful recovery if their accident occurred after the sale’s 
closing date. However, someone else injured by the same automobile 
purchased at the same time and arising from the same defect may not expect 
recovery if their injury occurred prior to the sale’s closing. These people, 
differentiated only by when their accidents happened, are, through the 
application and then setting aside of bankruptcy rules, being subjected to 
radically disparate treatment, with future claimants being afforded full 
                                                                                                                 
Pension Trust v. Chrysler L.L.C., 130 S.Ct. 1015 (2009). However, while a judicial remedy for the 
Treasury Department’s decisions seems unlikely, the Court’s general attitude toward 
administrative policy-making militates towards a vision that such policy choices be the product of 
rationality, and not arbitrarily applied. See U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231 (2001). 
 185. See Warranty Commitment Program, supra note 15. 
 186. See Emison Blog, supra note 182. 
 187. See id. (“Under the original plans Chrysler and GM would have repaired the defective 
vehicles under warranty claims, but if that same defect caused injury, the consumer would get 
nothing. The companies would have fixed the car, but not the people.”).  
 188. See Warranty Commitment Program, supra note 15.  
 189. See Spector, supra note 19. 
 190. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
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potential recovery and prepetition and pendency claimants afforded little to 
no recovery.191 
This unacceptable result is enhanced by the fact that while future 
claimants represent a contingent and nebulous class,192 prepetition and 
pendency claimants are a closed set.193 Prepetition and pendency claims are 
limited to accidents that have already occurred but have not yet been 
compensated, while future claims arise from accidents for all Old GM and 
Old Chrysler vehicles still on the road.194 Therefore, future claims 
encompass a potentially larger group with a greater encumbrance upon the 
purchasers’ assets than do prepetition and pendency claims. Perhaps the 
potential volume of such claims explains why the movement to pressure 
GM and Chrysler to accept future claims liability gained such traction and 
eventually succeeded. However, leaving prepetition and pendency 
claimants with either no recovery or meaningless recovery, given the extent 
of their injuries and the inadequacy of the money set aside for them, while 
allowing full recovery for future claimants, seems inherently capricious.195 
Admittedly, there are other distinctions to be drawn. For instance, the 
resale market is strongly implicated by the disposition of future claims but 
not by prepetition and pendency ones. If the status of future claims is 
uncertain, the value of used GM and Chrysler vehicles is diminished, thus 
impairing the new companies’ ancillary parts and repair concerns. It may 
also be argued that the government’s policy choices in the warranty and 
                                                                                                                 
 191. See Interview with J. Kent Emison, supra note 133. There are no limitations to either New 
GM’s or New Chrysler’s assumption of future claims liability while prepetition and pendency 
claims are left with either functionally meaningless recovery in the case of GM, or no recovery in 
the case of Chrysler. Id. 
 192. See Tung, supra note 152, at 438–40. 
 193. See Interview with J. Kent Emison, supra note 133. Prepetition and pendency claimants 
(defined as those who purchased their automobiles before closing and were involved in accidents 
before closing) had until November 30, 2009 to assert their claims. Id. The reason GM claimants 
would want to file such a claim is for the possibility that they may recover as members of the 
subclass of unsecured claimants entitled to a pro rata share of the consideration set aside for Old 
GM in the MPA. Id. As discussed previously, however, recovery under this plan amounts to 
pennies on the dollar. Id. This means that claimants in this position are under a great temptation to 
settle their claims or sell them in the unsecured claims market. Id. In either of these scenarios, 
their expectation of recovery is minimal and often meaningless in relation to their injuries. Id.  
 194. Id. 
 195. See Thomas A. Smith, A Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 104 YALE 
L.J. 367, 382 (1994). “[F]or mass tort bankruptcies that involve serious injuries to at least some 
claimants, fairness requires equal treatment of claimants regardless of the timing of their claims. 
This result, I believe, is consistent with the moral intuitions of most people who have reflected on 
these issues.” Id. Professor Smith, in making these comments, was dealing with future tort 
claimants in the context of confirmation of a bankruptcy plan. See id. Given their nebulous status 
compared to present claimants, future tort claimants are at a comparative disadvantage in the 
negotiation process and thus more risk averse and likely to accept less recovery in contemplating 
plan confirmation. Id. While the result in the automakers’ situation may be inverted (with future 
claimants representing a potentially larger subclass), the thrust of Professor Smith’s argument 
remains: disparate treatment of future and present tort claimants in the context of bankruptcy is 
offensive to traditional notions of equity and fairness. Id. 
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products liability arenas were grounded in purely financial considerations. 
In both situations the promotion of consumer confidence was a central 
concern.196 While these distinctions are warranted, the division between 
future claims and prepetition and pendency claims remains an arbitrary 
bifurcation of the class.197 Financial and commercial viability also informed 
the government’s decision to effectuate GM and Chrysler’s restructurings 
through the mechanism of § 363 asset sales so as to insulate the purchasers 
from cumbersome liabilities.198 If maximizing the fiscal value of the assets 
to the purchaser is a core function of § 363, that function is undermined—
not enhanced— by some of the government’s actions. As noted above, the 
volume of liability for future claims may plausibly outweigh those for 
prepetition and pendency ones, suggesting that other considerations were 
also at play. If policy concerns weighed heavily on the government’s 
choices, then issues of fairness and equitable treatment are proper lenses 
through which to scrutinize those choices.199 
V. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
The special treatment of pendency warranty claimants under the 
Warranty Commitment Program200 demonstrates the federal government’s 
willingness to apply public policy to circumvent the generic application of a 
§ 363 asset sale within Chapter 11. The considerations that led to this and 
other policy choices in the bailout may have been valid subjects of policy, 
but to allow GM and Chrysler to continue to use § 363 to shield themselves 
from liability for people situated so closely to those for whom exceptions 
have been made renders that policy’s application arbitrary and unfair. Given 
the dangerousness of the precedent set by the government, several solutions 
should be considered to ameliorate these inequities. 
Using liberal estimates, GM and Chrysler’s prepetition and pendency 
products liability claimants represent a total potential class of 2000 people 
with potential recovery of up to $4 billion.201 While not an inconsiderable 
sum, this number is dwarfed by what the government has committed to 
ensuring these companies’ long-term viability.202 Because the Treasury 
Department insisted that New GM assume future claims liability within 
                                                                                                                 
 196. See Warranty Commitment Program, supra note 15. 
 197. See Tung, supra note 152, at 482–83 (“Equal treatment of creditors similarly situated is a 
central bankruptcy policy.”). Professor Tung acknowledges that equal treatment across entire 
classes of creditors has been “described as a ‘weak’ bankruptcy norm,” but goes on to argue that 
fairness requires similar treatment of similarly situated subclasses, such as “current and future tort 
claimants.” Id. at 482–83 n.184. 
 198. Hearing Part II, supra note 11, at 21–23. 
 199. See Tung, supra note 152, at 482. 
 200. See discussion supra Part IV.B.  
 201. See discussion, supra Part III.C. 
 202. See ProPublica–General Motors, supra note 7; ProPublica–Chrysler, supra note 8. 
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bankruptcy,203 and applied pressure to New Chrysler to assume it after its 
restructuring had been consummated,204 it is not unreasonable for the 
Treasury Department to make a similar demand for the sake of severely 
injured prepetition and pendency claimants for whom there exists no 
recovery under the current scheme. 
This total-recovery solution, however, is not the only possibility. 
Despite Chrysler’s insistence that its financial outlook has improved 
greatly,205 the long-term viability of neither Chrysler nor GM is assured.206 
Furthermore, since concerns about the resale market and about the difficulty 
in assuming all pre-closing products liability claims207 provide at least a 
plausible rationale for the bisection of the class of claimants, certain 
mitigations on recovery for prepetition and pendency claims may be 
justified. Given the fragility of the economy and the disastrous effects a 
failure of the automakers would wreak,208 more moderate options are 
available that could both provide significant recovery to victims and prove 
less of a burden on manufacturers. First, tort law provides precedent for the 
limitation of recovery to compensatory damages.209 Second, in exchange for 
the assumption of prepetition and pendency claim liabilities, manufacturers 
and claimants could insist on a substantial reduction of attorney’s fees,210 
limiting the total amount by which recovery is offset. Third, an interest-
bearing investment account, subject to some of the limitations listed above, 
could be established, funded by the automakers and through Treasury 
Department loans to provide for products liability claimants.211 Given tort 
                                                                                                                 
 203. See Spector, supra note 19. 
 204. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 205. Bozzella Letter, supra note 149. 
 206. Rattner, supra note 94. 
Like any patient that undergoes major surgery, a successful recovery is far from 
assured. For Chrysler, the biggest challenges are its need to regenerate its product line 
and manage a significantly leveraged balance sheet. In the case of GM, the overarching 
question is whether, without an infusion of new blood, its management team can 
implement the massive cultural change that is essential. 
Id. 
 207. See discussion supra Part IV.B.  
 208. See In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 476–77 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (detailing 
the potentially disastrous fallout that would occur if American automakers collapsed). 
 209. See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680 (2006) (limiting the recovery in tort 
for claims against the United States to compensatory damages only). 
 210. Id. § 2678. The Federal Tort Claims Act places several limitations by percentage on the 
fees a plaintiff’s attorney may collect in tort actions against the government. Id. It is conceivable 
that similar limitations could be justified to provide recovery to claimants for whom no 
meaningful recovery presently exists. 
 211. The Warranty Commitment Program provides an excellent precedent for how such an 
account would function. See Warranty Commitment Program, supra note 15. GM and Chrysler 
have both already repaid the Treasury Department’s commitment under that program, totaling 
roughly $640 million. ProPublica–General Motors, supra note 7; ProPublica–Chrysler, supra note 
8. While the amount necessary to cover recovery for prepetition and pendency claimants stands to 
be significantly higher, this total may be mitigated by some of the limitations set out above and by 
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claimants’ arguably unfair priority in bankruptcy,212 this fund should be 
shared only by them and not divided pro rata among all unsecured creditors. 
If the Treasury Department can justify providing “financial stabilization” 
TARP monies to cover GM and Chrysler warranties, temporarily funding a 
recovery trust for prepetition and pendency products liability claimants is 




This note has attempted to establish several key facts. First, without 
significant financial assistance from the Treasury Department, GM and 
Chrysler would likely have fallen into complete insolvency resulting in 
liquidation bankruptcies with catastrophic results.213 Second, that assistance 
primarily took the form of a distribution of bailout funds in debt and short 
and long-term equity totaling over $63 billion.214 Third, the government 
explicitly endorsed the use of asset sales under § 363 so that the companies 
could emerge from bankruptcy free and clear of burdensome liabilities.215 
Fourth, despite this endorsement, the government, through the Warranty 
Commitment Program and the application of political pressure, ensured that 
the emergent purchaser-companies would be responsible for certain 
liabilities that would not have otherwise attached through such asset 
sales.216  
Had the GM and Chrysler restructurings occurred through the normal 
course of Chapter 7 or 11, or even through the expedited process afforded 
through a generic § 363 asset sale, all products liability claims arising from 
automobiles purchased pre-closing would have been either explicitly or 
effectively rendered moot. Others have argued that this result is 
unacceptable and that the Code should either be interpreted differently or 
amended.217 Those debates will continue to rage.  
However, when the Treasury Department is used as an instrument for 
the effectuation of public policy, such power must not be wielded 
capriciously. Principles of fairness and equity should factor into any such 
decision, particularly when the interests of people with serious injuries are 
implicated. Because recovery has been provided to some claimants and not 
                                                                                                                 
allowing GM and Chrysler more time to repay loans under this program. See discussion supra Part 
III.C. 
 212. See Painter, supra note 55, at 1046–47. 
 213. In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. at 476–77 (noting that the government’s fear that 
the automakers’ failure would likely engender widespread job loss, ancillary business failures, and 
create a disastrous systemic ripple effect on the U.S. economy was well founded).  
 214. See ProPublica–General Motors, supra note 7; ProPublica–Chrysler, supra note 8. 
 215. See Fact Sheet, Chrysler, supra note 114; Fact Sheet, GM, supra note 114. 
 216. In re General Motors, 407 B.R. at 481–82. 
 217. See generally Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 86; Kuney, supra note 24; Kuney & St. 
James, supra note 6. 
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to others based on a somewhat arbitrary distinction between accidents that 
occurred pre- and post-closing, the government must ameliorate the 
injustice and insist upon a more equitable approach. Either all who merit it 
should recover or none should. 
Robert Marko* 
 
                                                                                                                 
 *  B.A., Columbia University, 1997; J.D. candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2011. All my 
thanks to Professor Edward Janger, as well as to Allegra M. Selvaggio, Joseph Antignani, Samuel 
J. Gordon, and Christopher Vidiksis for their guidance and assistance, without which this Note 
would never have come to fruition. Special thanks should be reserved for Professor Aaron 
Twerski for his tutelage, inspiration, and generosity. I would also like to extend particular 
appreciation to Mr. J. Kent Emison and Mr. Larry Coben for their generous contributions of time 
and expertise. Finally, to Meriwether, thank you for your limitless faith, patience, and support. 
 
